Posts filed under 'Cause Challenges'
On the day the jury was sworn - after a week of voir dire - a prospective juror got a traffic ticket. The ticket was for the “crime” of knowingly driving on a suspended license, a second-degree misdemeanor. No one in the courtroom on that day asked her about it. She didn’t tell anyone about it. And she ended up serving on the jury that convicted Jason Tucker of premeditated first-degree murder. Tucker appealed his conviction on the grounds that Florida Statute 40.013(1) states: “No person who is under prosecution for any crime…shall be qualified to serve as a juror.” On Friday, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, while recognizing the undisputed nature of the “crime,” rejected his argument and affirmed the conviction. Tucker v. State 33 FLW D1617d (Fla 5th DCA, June 20, 2008).
The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction for two reasons: 1) this prospective juror was not “under prosecution” for this crime in this scenario (as used in the jury qualification statute) because the state attorney had not exercised his discretion to pursue the charges against her through formal judicial proceedings (i.e. merely getting the ticket was not enough), and 2) even if this juror was “under prosecution” during jury service, a new trial was not warranted because there was no showing of prejudice by Tucker.
June 23rd, 2008
Today the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a criminal conviction because the trial judge failed to strike for cause a juror who “held conflicting views” on the presumption of innocence. Initially, during jury selection the juror stated “he’s guilty until proven innocent,” but later said “I think it was a misunderstanding earlier…,” and then went on to state ”I can be fair and impartial.” The Court looked at the entirety of the juror’s comments (which are set forth in the opinion) and concluded there was reasonable doubt about the juror’s ability to serve in the case. The Court reiterated the long-standing principle that “close cases involving challenges to the impartiality of potential jurors should be resolved in favor of excusing the juror rather than leaving a doubt as to impartiality.” Joseph v. State, __ So.2d __ (Fla 4th DCA, June 18, 2008.)
The opinion also sets forth the procedural steps which must be taken in order to preserve error in this situation. Defense counsel properly: 1) used all peremptory challenges, 2) requested an additional peremptory challenge, 3) objected to the court’s denial of the request for additional peremptory challenges, and 4) identified the juror he was required to accept as objectionable. The court noted, “It is not necessary that a defendant explain why the venireperson for whom the additional peremptory challenge was sought was objectionable; they must merely identify that individual as objectionable.”
Bottom line: The juror’s statements, taken in their entirety, and although coupled with an expression that she could be fair and impartial, raised a reasonable doubt about her impartiality, and she should have been excused for cause.
June 18th, 2008
This week, in Rodriguez v. Lagomasino, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a defense verdict in an auto accident case because the trial judge failed to strike two questionable jurors for cause. During voir dire, prospective Juror Gutierrez said he would not favor either side and would be “in the middle,” but he had also said his wife had been in an auto accident and his insurance company was going double his rates. He said he did not know if he could put his wife’s situation aside. Another prospective juror, Mr. Hillberry said he thought there should be caps on damages because of all the frivolous lawsuits in our litigious society. Juror Hillberry said he doubted his “thoughts” would come into play in this particular case, but he admitted it was possible they could. The Miami trial judge, Daryl Trawick, refused to strike the jurors for cause because “based upon their responses” he felt ”they were rehabilitated.”
The Third District reversed based on Florida law’s well established ”reasonable doubt” standard, and cited Nash v. General Motors Corp. 734 So. 2d 437 (Fla 3d DCA 1999), “When any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence submtted and the instructions on the law given to her by the court, she should be excused.”
January 26th, 2008
Last week, in Algie v. Lennar Corp., the 4th District Court of Appeal reversed a defense verdict in a slip and fall case. A juror had told the lawyers during jury selection that although he wouldn’t have any problem “serving fairly” if chosen, he believed that in every slip and fall case the person who slips and falls is at least partially responsible. The juror said this would factor into his decision in the case and would be something the plaintiff would have to overcome in order to prevail.
Referring back to the seminal Supreme Court decision of Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla 1959), and its progeny, the court observed that although the juror in this case subsequently stated he believed he could be fair, the juror never recanted or receded from his earlier expressed view. The court held that any “ambiguities or uncertainties” concerning a juror’s impartiality must be resolved in favor of excusing the juror. Therefore, the defense verdict was reversed.
November 19th, 2007
During jury selection a potential juror stated she “did not think she could focus on the trial.” Both sides agreed she should be stricken for cause. But the trial judge refused to strike her, and she ended up on the jury. (This alone would probably have resulted in a quick reversal of any verdict). However, after the first day of testimony, the woman raised her hand (she obviously REALLY didn’t want to be there) and told the judge she lived near the store where the incident occurred. She said she disagreed with the police officer’s testimony about which direction the store faced. She said her independent knowledge about the store made her distrust the testimony of the officer, and she no longer thought she could be fair and impartial. The judge then dismissed her from the jury (saving the almost certain reversal) and seated an alternate in her place. On appeal, the Fifth District affirmed the trial judge’s actions, and held it was not error to remove the juror from the jury. The Court held that the juror’s “own expressions of doubt about her ability to decide the case impartially easily provided a reasonable doubt about her ability to decide the case solely on the evidence,” and therefore justified her removal from the case. Lowry v. State, 32 FLW D1978 (Fla 5th DCA 2007).
This case demonstrates, once again, the problems that can arise when judges attempt to keep jurors who are trying to get out of serving on a case. It is a frustrating and all-too-common reality of voir dire. However, this issue was squarely addressed in a recent decision from the Fourth District. “We recognize that, here, the trial court and the appellees’ counsel may well have been right in surmising that the juror really ‘did not want to be there’ and ‘wanted off this jury.’ But, close issues as to juror bias are resolved in favor of excusing the juror, rather than leaving a doubt.” See, Four Wood Consulting, LLC v. Fyne, __ So2d __ (Fla 4th DCA 2007).
September 14th, 2007
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a breach of contract case for failure to excuse a Juror Green for cause who said she had a “bad taste” from having been sued in the past which would “probably” cause her to view the case with prejudice one way or another. The problem was — Green never did say against whom she would be prejudiced, and none of the attorneys ever followed up during voir dire to find out, and no one ever bothered to ask her whether she could set her “negative feelings” aside. At one point during jury selection the trial judge asked the panel as a whole whether there was anyone on the panel who would not have the parties starting off on the same starting line, like in a race, but none of the prospective jurors responded verbally.
The 4th DCA applied the reasonable doubt standard and reversed the verdict. The Court noted that “while the juror was silent when the court advised the panel that both parties are entitled to ’start off at the same line’ and inquired of the panel whether they could wait until ‘the end of the race’ to deliberate and determine what the verdict should be, reasonable doubt is not overcome by a juror’s silence as to a question asked on the entire panel.” Four Wood Consulting, LLC v. Fyne, __ So. 2d __ (Fla 4th DCA 8/22/07)
Interestingly, the Court also observed: “We recognize that, here, the trial court and the appellees’ counsel may well have been right in surmising that the juror really ‘did not want to be there’ and ‘wanted off this jury.’ But, close issues as to juror bias are resolved in favor of excusing the juror, rather than leaving a doubt.”
August 24th, 2007
The Supreme Court of Florida properly reversed a jury verdict in a case where counsel was forced to use a peremptory strike during jury selection on a juror who should have been stricken for cause. The jury verdict was reversed even though it was undisputed on appeal that the jury that ultimately decided the case was a “constitutionally impartial” jury. The Supreme Court held it is prejudice “per se” to require counsel to use even a single peremptory strike on a prospective juror if there was a “reasonable doubt” about that juror’s impartiality. No showing of “actual prejudice” is required on appeal. See, Kopsho v. State, 32 FLW S258 (Fla 2007).
This case reaffims the importance of peremptory strikes and demonstrates the unique position they have in jury selection in Florida. The purpose of peremptory challenges is different than the purpose of challenges for cause. In Florida, a juror should be stricken for cause by the Court if the juror is legally objectionable, i.e. if there is a “reasonable doubt” about the juror’s impartiality. Peremptory strikes are different. They are discretionary strikes for counsel. They can be used by counsel to remove potential jurors who are NOT otherwise legally objectionable. They can be used by counsel to remove potential jurors who your gut tells you will not be good jurors in your case. They are for removing the potential jurors who give you the willies, even while the “record” is clean, and even while they smile and proudly proclaim they can be fair and impartial and follow the court’s instructions. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held it is “per se” reversible error for a trial judge to require counsel to use even a single peremptory strike on a juror who should have been stricken for cause. Forcing counsel to use even one discretionary peremptory strike on such a juror is reversible error, EVEN if the jury that ultimately decides the case is an impartial jury. It is prejudice “per se” to require counsel to use a precious peremptory strike on a juror if there was a reasonable doubt about that juror’s impartiality. On appeal, in Florida, it is not necessary to show that there was “actual prejudice” or that the jury that returned the verdict was somehow biased. That is how important discretionary peremptory strikes are during jury selection in Florida.
A common misconception of many trial judges during jury selection is that peremptory strikes can and should be used by counsel to “cure” improperly denied cause challenges. This is one of the most common mistakes made by trial judges during voir dire. Counsel should not have to use one of his or her precious and limited peremptory strikes to cure an error by the trial judge. Counsel is immediately at a disadvantage when opposing counsel suddenly has more of these discretionary strikes due to an error of the trial judge in failing to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause. That disadvantage is “per se” reversible error. Peremptory strikes are different and unique, and in Kopsho, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed their importance in the law of jury selection in Florida.
June 22nd, 2007
At the conclusion of Voir Dire, the Defendant wanted to strike four jurors for cause. The judge denied all the challenges. At least one of the jurors was questionable. On appeal, a new trial was ordered by the 4th DCA because ”seating a single juror whose impartiality may reasonably be questioned is a structural error not subject to harmless error analysis.”
In Dorsett v. State, __ So2d __ (4 DCA 2006). the Court noted that the prospective juror had stated she thought the defendant should have to prove his innocence. There was nothing in the record to indicate she ever receded from that preconception. Thus, there was a doubt about her impartiality. “A juror is not impartial when she has difficultly accepting and employing the presumption of innocence.” It was error for the trial court to deny the challenge for cause, and a new trial was ordered.
November 22nd, 2006
It was fifty years ago last month that Marilyn Burch Fagan was found dead by her husband on the walkway of their home near rural Gainesville. Her husband, Osee Fagan, the County Prosecutor, was involved in the prosecution of a deaf mute, Philip Singer. Returning home near midnight from a late night at the office, he found his wife’s body in the darkness of their front yard underneath the bright starlit country skies. His young daughter was still sleeping soundly inside the home. Marilyn was not only the wife of the County Prosecutor; she was also a socialite and the daughter of one of the wealthiest men in the community. The tale that unfolds as the prosecution of the deaf mute wound its way through the Florida judicial system resulted in the landmark decision of Singer v. State , the case which is still the foundation of all jury selection law in the State of Florida. Take a moment to read it, not only to refresh this case in your mind, but also in memory of Marilyn Burch Fagan, the wife of one of our fellow trial lawyers, and also her husband, Osee Fagan, who went on to become a Circuit Judge, and who is now retired and who still lives in Gainesville.
September 11th, 2006
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(c)(1) was amended and became effective March 1, 2006, to provide a statutory basis for a challenge for cause against a potential juror who is related (within the third degree) to a Fabre Defendant. The new rule reads, in pertinent part:
Continue Reading March 1st, 2006
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On the day the jury was sworn - after a week of voir dire - a prospective juror got a traffic ticket. The ticket was for the “crime” of knowingly driving on a suspended license, a second-degree misdemeanor. No one in the courtroom on that day asked her about it. She didn’t tell anyone about it. And she ended up serving on the jury that convicted Jason Tucker of premeditated first-degree murder. Tucker appealed his conviction on the grounds that Florida Statute 40.013(1) states: “No person who is under prosecution for any crime…shall be qualified to serve as a juror.” On Friday, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, while recognizing the undisputed nature of the “crime,” rejected his argument and affirmed the conviction. Tucker v. State 33 FLW D1617d (Fla 5th DCA, June 20, 2008).