The high Court reviewed the trial transcript and concluded that the two reasons proffered by the prosecution as justification for the strike (1: that the black student looked nervous, and 2: that he had a student-teaching obligation to fulfill) were pretextual. The Court observed that this prospective juror was 1 of more than 50 venire members expressing concern that jury service would interfere with work, school, family or other obligations, and therefore that the prosecutor’s explanation was implausible.

What happened? During jury selection the prosecutor sought to use a peremptory strike on a white male — Juror Lynn. The Defense objected stating that, as a white male, Juror Lynn was a member of a protected class, and requested that the State provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. The trial court allowed the peremptory strike without requiring the State to provide a race-neutral reason. Whitby was convicted by Juror Lynn (and others), and on appeal, the Third District in a lengthy opinion reluctantly overturned the conviction due to the failure of the trial judge to require the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral reason for the strike. See, Whitby v. State , 933 So. 2d 557 (Fla 3d DCA 2006).

Although the Supreme Court initially accepted review of the case on the basis that it concerned a question of great public importance, the Court later decided not to hear it. However, the concurring opinion of Justice Pariente and the dissenting opinion of Justice Cantero in this case are educational, informative and well worth reading. The justices both argue their positions persuasively, and they illustrate the vast difference between Florida law and Federal law in the area of “Neil” challenges. There appears to be a 4/3 split in our Supreme Court on this issue.

The issue boils down to whether the party challenging an opposing party’s peremptory strike as being discriminatory must do something more than merely object to the strike on the grounds that the prospective juror is a member of a distinct racial group. In the federal courts, the challenging party must establish a prima facie case of discrimination before the other side is required to provide an explanation for the strike. But in Florida, under Melbourne v. State, 679 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1996) and its prodigy, that is not required. As Justice Pariente points out in her concurring opinion, “Florida courts generally have provided parties greater protection than federal courts in preventing discriminatory jury selection practices.”

The Procedure in Florida is relatively simple: “A party objecting to the other side’s use of a peremptory challenge on racial grounds must: a) make a timely objection on that basis, b) show that the venireperson is a member of a distinct racial group [in this case - a white male], and c) request that the court ask the striking party its reason for the strike. If these initial requirements are met (step 1), the court must ask the proponent of the strike to explain the reason for the strike.” See, Melbourne v. State, supra. There is no requirement in Florida to prove a prima facie case of discrimination as there is in federal court.

Professor Thaddeus Hoffmeister, at the University of Dayton School of Law, applauded the Supreme Court’s decision in his blog last week. He wrote that, in his opinion, Florida has made significant strides recently in improving its jury system, and that as a result of Florida law ”it is much easier in Florida to ensure that neither party is basing their peremptory challenges on either race, ethnicity or gender.” See, Juries.�

In Glinton, the defendant objected to the striking of two black jurors during voir dire. However, prior to swearing in the panel, the trial court asked if the panel was acceptable to both sides. Both attorneys accepted the jury and said they were satisfied, thereby failing to properly preserve for appeal the issue of the alleged improper striking of the two black jurors.

Fla R Civ P 1.431(f) states that no one shall be sworn as a juror until the jury has been accepted by the parties or until all challenges have been exhausted. However, I am unaware of any rule that obligates the court to ask the lawyers whether the jury is acceptable at the conclusion of voir dire. It may be just a custom or tradition and/or curiosity with some judges. As a practical matter it would seem prudent for the trial lawyer to always object to the jury panel before it is sworn thereby preserving all issues and objections raised during voir dire.

In Ruger v. State, 941 So. 2d 1182 (Fla 4 DCA 2006), the Court held that although “body language” can be a race-neutral reason for a strike, the lawyer’s strike in this case did not appear “genuine” because he did not strike other jurors who were exhibiting the same kind of behavior. The Court also held that  “bad vibes” are an insufficient reason for a strike because “The case law is clear that a ‘feeling’ about a juror is not a valid, neutral reason to exercise a strike, absent support in the record.”

Judge Gary Farmer, writing for a unanimous panel, wrote, “This juror was a member of an objectively discernible group.” He noted that there are approximately 500,000 Pakistani people living in the United States, that Pakistanis are overwhelminly Muslim, and that their population is heavily Semitic in origin. “We therefore think its culture, language, history and — yes — its religion, make it objectively and discernibly large, distinct and homogeneous enough to be deemed an ethnic group capable of identification.”

The court noted that although lawyers have traditionally used the phrase “race neutral” when asserting a “Neil challenge,” a better term would be “non-invidious” because the case law encompasses not only race, but also sex and ethnicity.